African Mega-Pipeline Could Deliver Nigerian Gas to Europe After 2030
A. WALSTAD, European Correspondent, Greater London, England
(P&GJ) — An ambitious subsea pipeline project that would transport gas from Nigeria to Morocco and then on to Europe is appearing somewhat more realistic as the EU continues to scramble to diversify supplies following the ban on Russian gas.
With a length of up to 7,000 km (4,350 mi) and an estimated cost in the region of $25 billion, the African-Atlantic Gas Pipeline (AAGP) is one of the most ambitious pipeline projects in the world. However, it has been written off as unrealistic by many observers.
The project has a long and troubled history, having been on the drawing board in various shapes and forms for some 15 yrs. However, recent developments suggest the 30-billion cubic meters per year (Bm³y) (1-Tft³y) project could be edging towards final investment decision (FID) in the foreseeable future.
Discussions are currently ongoing, and on February 11–13, 2026, senior executives from the West African Gas Pipeline Co. Ltd. (WAPCo)—which transports natural gas in Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana—visited Rabat, Morocco to participate in what they called a high-level regional workshop on the AAGP project. According to a statement, discussions focused on WAPCo’s “possible involvement” in the AAGP.
Morocco’s delegation was led by Amina Benkhadra, Director General of the National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines (ONHYM), while Nigeria’s delegation was headed by Ahmad R. Khalid, General Counsel and Company Secretary at the Nigerian Gas Infrastructure Co. Ltd. (NGIC).
High-level talks aside, it is worth examining the route of the proposed pipeline to get an idea of the level of ambition. The subsea pipeline would span no less than 13 African countries along the Atlantic coast—Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Senegal and Mauritania—before finally reaching Morocco. From Morocco, the gas could reach Europe via the ~12-Bm³y Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline (GME). The GME pipeline previously transported gas from Algeria to Spain via Morocco until its contract expired in 2021. The contract was not renewed due to worsening diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara dispute. It is not entirely clear if and how additional gas volumes from the AAGP would be exported to Europe or if the remainder of the gas would be consumed by African nations, including Morocco itself.
Signs of progress. Nevertheless, Justin Dargin, Chairman at Tangelic—an energy and infrastructure development platform working across African markets—said there are credible signs of renewed momentum behind the AAGP project.
“Nigeria and Morocco have moved beyond concept, completed core feasibility and early engineering work, and established a dedicated project company to take the next steps forward. For a project of this scale and geopolitical sensitivity, that institutional move matters and points to a clearer pathway toward a potential final investment decision,” said Dargin.
Part of the momentum, according to Dargin, reflects how participating African countries view the project in the context of access to energy and economic growth.
“Along the route, governments increasingly see the pipeline not just as an export link to Europe, but also as a platform for gas-to-power, industrial growth, fertilizer production and deeper regional integration. Those domestic and energy security co-benefits help explain the political commitment behind it.”
Dargin cautions however that the AAGP is a long-horizon project, not an imminent build. Core execution issues, such as bankable financing, transit and sovereign risk allocation, anchor off-take and construction sequencing are crucial points that remain unresolved.
“The progress is real, but it is still preliminary, and the gap between political intent and construction-ready reality remains wide,” he said.
Diversification is key. Europe—particularly Spain and France—already imports some volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Nigeria. However, adding 30 Bm³y of pipeline gas from that country would help diversify imports amid the imminent EU ban on Russian gas, which is already being phased in and will take full effect by the autumn of 2027. There are also growing concerns about over-dependency on U.S. LNG at a time when diplomatic relations between Washington and European capitals are being severely tested—not least over the Greenland dispute.
However, Francis Ghiles, Senior Research Fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and a Visiting Fellow at King’s College in London, is not convinced that Europe needs the pipeline. He points to an uncertain outlook for gas demand.
“Even if Nigerian gas arrives in Morocco, where does it go from there? Europe’s need for gas is not going to increase in the years ahead—it may even diminish,” Ghiles said.
“The question is: how much extra gas, in addition to what has already been contracted from the U.S., Qatar and others, does Europe need? That begs another question: who is going to finance this pipeline? The costs will be huge, and even if Europe gets less gas from the U.S. than previously anticipated, the AAGP project does not seem to make economic sense.”
On this topic, Dargin also notes that Europe’s medium- to long-term demand for pipeline gas is softening as renewables scale, electrification accelerates and efficiency gains accumulate. This is reinforced by the EU’s broader decarbonization agenda. The market case for a project of this scale remains contested and highly sensitive to how Europe’s energy transition and geopolitical posture evolve over the next decade, according to Dargin.
“At the same time, Europe has rapidly expanded LNG import capacity and storage, favoring flexible, short-cycle supply over large, capital-intensive long-distance pipelines,” he said.
Nigeria has vast reserves. Nigeria produced about 47 Bm³ of gas in 2024, up from the previous year’s numbers but lower than 2021’s peak of > 52 Bm³, according to the Statistical Review of World Energy. LNG exports, meanwhile, stood at around 18 Bm³. Nigeria is making efforts to increase gas production, but there are doubts as to what extent it will be successful in doing so. Its gas reserves are vast, but there is the question of how to monetize it, as investor confidence in the West African nation is a very mixed picture.
Additionally, there are security risks to consider. The pipeline would, for example, cross Western Saharan waters, which is disputed territory between Morocco and the pro-independence Polisario Front backed by Algeria.
Dargin noted that long-distance gas pipelines have proven vulnerable to disruption, even in relatively stable environments, as repeated attacks on pipeline infrastructure in Egypt have demonstrated. These come in addition to attacks that have occurred on energy infrastructure across Nigeria and the surrounding region over the past two decades.
“Along the African-Atlantic route, varying degrees of low-intensity insurgency, criminal activity and political instability increase both construction and operational risk, while driving up the cost of insurance, monitoring and physical protection,” he said.
2030 comes too soon. A 2030 completion target has previously been mentioned for the project, but this is looking less and less realistic. Dargin says the task is further complicated by the need to align financing structures, transit arrangements, sovereign and commercial risk mitigation, and phased construction across multiple legal and regulatory regimes.
“Even with strong political backing, feasibility and front-end engineering and design (FEED) work well advanced, projects of this scale typically take a decade or more to move from final investment decision to commissioning, including in developed markets,” he said.
However, at the same time, the urgency behind the project reflects real political and economic pressures, Dargin added.
“Many African governments view gas development as a narrowing opportunity to support industrialization, expand power generation and stabilize public finances before global decarbonization trends begin to materially constrain long-term hydrocarbon demand.”
He noted, “That urgency, however, coexists with a genuine stranded-asset risk. Europe’s accelerating decarbonization agenda, combined with the prospect of a global gas supply glut later this decade, raises questions about long-term demand for pipeline gas.”
Meanwhile, Ghiles says that there are better alternatives for Europe than betting on pipeline gas from Nigeria. One option is to increase imports from Algeria via existing pipelines. Algeria boasts three gas pipelines already feeding into the EU: the 10-Bm³y Medgaz pipeline to Spain, the aforementioned MEG pipeline to Spain and Portugal and the 33.5-Bm³y Trans-Mediterranean (TransMed) Pipeline connecting Algeria with Italy that is operating below capacity.
“Europe should look towards Algeria again. Gas buyers could sign long-term contracts for 15 yrs instead of 1 yr–2 yr contracts, which is currently the case. That would stimulate gas production as Algeria has more gas in the ground. Another advantage is that Algeria’s gas pipelines to Italy and Spain are amortized and have spare capacity,” he said.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
ANDREAS WALSTAD is a freelance journalist with two decades of experience reporting on energy out of London and Brussels. Published by a number of leading energy publications, he also writes in-depth energy reports for law firms and consultants. He holds university qualifications in both journalism and economics, and he is experienced in moderating conferences and discussion panels.